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Regulatory arbitrage refers to structuring activity to take advantage of gaps or 
differences in regulations or laws. Examples include Facebook modifying its 
terms and conditions to reduce the exposure of its user data to strict European 
privacy laws, and Uber and other platform companies organizing their affairs to 
categorize workers as nonemployees. This essay explores the constraints and 
limits on regulatory arbitrage through the lens of the technology industry, known 
for its adaptiveness and access to strategic resources. Specifically, the essay 
explores social license and the bundling of laws and resources as constraining 
forces on regulatory arbitrage, and the legal mismatch that can arise from new 
business models and innovations as a key area in which the limits of regulatory 
arbitrage can be observed.
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 Regulatory arbitrage refers to structuring activity to take advantage of gaps or 
differences in regulations or laws. Examples include Facebook modifying its terms and 
conditions to reduce the exposure of its user data to strict European privacy laws, and 
Uber and other platform companies organizing their affairs to categorize workers as non-
employees. This essay explores the constraints and limits on regulatory arbitrage through 
the lens of the technology industry, known for its adaptiveness and access to strategic 
resources. Specifically, the essay explores social license and the bundling of laws and 
resources as constraining forces on regulatory arbitrage, and the legal mismatch that can 
arise from new business models and innovations as a key area in which the limits of 
regulatory arbitrage can be observed.  
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“Your legal concepts of property, expression, identity, movement, and context do not 
apply to us. They are all based on matter, and there is no matter here.”  
    – Cyber-philosopher John Perry Barlow (1996)1 
 
1.  Introduction  
 
 Legal strategy or gamesmanship known as “regulatory arbitrage” has been 
defined in various ways, such as “transactions designed specifically to reduce costs or 
capture profit opportunities created by different regulations or laws.”2 Regulatory 
arbitrage “occurs when parties take advantage of a gap between the economics of a deal 
and its regulatory treatment.”3 With examples ranging from financial maneuvers such as 
tax shelters and shadow banking, to strategic choices such as offshoring business or 
assets, the discourse on regulatory arbitrage often revolves around how to solve it.4  
 As opportunity for regulatory arbitrage is created by gaps or differences in 
regulations or laws, the prevailing wisdom is that regulatory arbitrage can be 
counteracted by harmonization.5 But, recognizing that efforts at uniformity are 
contentious and difficult, other scholars suggest alternative solutions such as coordinating 
different legal regimes through conflicts-of-law rules.6 Another approach to regulatory 
																																																								
1 Barlow JP (1996) A declaration of the independence of cyberspace. Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence. 
2 Partnoy (1997), p 227. For additional discussion of the definition of regulatory arbitrage, see Part 2.1. 
3 Fleischer (2010), p 227. 
4 Regulatory arbitrage is generally perceived as a problem. See García (2019), p 207 (“[A]t its core, 
regulatory arbitrage is distortionary behavior that can thwart regulatory intent and disadvantage actors who 
play by the rules.”); Fleischer (2010), p 230 (“[A] more precise understanding of when and how 
gamesmanship occurs allows us to address the problem in a targeted fashion that avoids sweeping, 
overbroad reforms that do more harm than good.”). 
5 See, e.g., Weadon (2012) (discussing lack of international harmonization in OTC derivatives regulation). 
6 Riles (2014); see also Freeman and Rossi (2012) (discussing interagency coordination as a mechanism to 
reduce regulatory arbitrage). 
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arbitrage simply emphasizes the need to improve the drafting of laws and to use anti-
avoidance regimes.7 On the whole, a reader of the regulatory arbitrage literature is left 
with the impression that the problem could be fixed or at least significantly reduced if 
only we had harmonized laws, coordinated laws, or well-drafted laws. 
 A deeper look at the thin line between strategic legal planning and abusive 
conduct reveals a great number of related concepts to regulatory arbitrage. Discussion of 
these concepts reflect a similar stance of seeking solutions but also accepting some level 
of inevitability, whether it is through the language of loopholes, circumvention, 
avoidance, evasion, avoision, or regulatory cat-and-mouse.8 The law is riddled with 
loopholes to fill and well-resourced market participants will find a way to exploit patchy 
regulatory landscapes.9 Companies have the freedom to establish and structure their 
activities in ways that may be socially productive or may ultimately harm the public 
interest—policing this problem is both necessary and imperfect. 
 But what does not get much scholarly attention is a separate but related 
question—why don’t we see more regulatory arbitrage? What constrains it? Regulatory 
arbitrage takes advantage of gaps or differences in laws—these are in abundant supply 
around the world. 
																																																								
7 See, e.g., Barry (2011), p 73 (“[R]egulatory arbitrage can be eliminated by crafting legal rules that 
accurately track the economic substance of transactions. . . If there is no gap to take advantage of, there is 
no risk of regulatory arbitrage. When seen in this light, regulatory arbitrage is a phenomenon that follows 
from having regulations that fail to take economic reality into account.”). 
8 See Katz (1996), p 4 (coining the term “avoision” to refer to cases in which it is unclear whether conduct 
should be considered lawful avoidance or illegal evasion); Wu (2017); Burk (2016). 
9 See Wu (2018) (describing the economic and political power of large technology companies); Fleischer 
(2017), p 230 (“[T]he rich, sophisticated, well-advised, and politically connected avoid regulatory burdens 
the rest of us comply with.”). 
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 We might be especially concerned about large and potentially even growing 
amounts of regulatory arbitrage in the tech industry because it is highly adaptive by its 
nature in the digital era. Entrepreneurship has always represented the pursuit of new and 
better ways of doing things and the potential for “creative destruction.”10 And, in an era 
of digital technology ranging from cryptocurrency to platforms, innovation has a global 
reach that appears untethered to physical presence. Tech companies are particularly well-
positioned to create new products and services that don’t quite fit existing categorizations 
and to flexibly move vast intangible wealth across jurisdictions. The tech industry is 
notorious for design that pushes the regulatory envelope and aggressively uses rhetoric to 
defy legal norms and shape legal classifications.11 
 Furthermore, some of the largest and most powerful companies in the world are in 
the tech industry.12 Many of the tech behemoths have engaged in notable regulatory 
arbitrage that has captured news headlines. Apple Corporation, for instance, famously 
escaped tax liability by figuring out a way to put billions of profits in subsidiaries that 
exploited differences in U.S. and Irish laws.13 Once Irish officials cracked down on the 
tax structure, Apple moved its strategy to Jersey in the Channel Islands.14  
																																																								
10 Schumpeter (1942). 
11 Pollman (forthcoming) (discussing tech culture and permissionless innovation); Stemler (2017) 
(discussing rhetorical devices and techniques used by sharing economy companies to avoid legal rules and 
obligations). 
12 See Cohen (2017), p 199 (“Although such [platform] corporations are nominally headquartered in 
particular countries and have physical assets in many other countries that are amenable to control in 
varying degrees, their great economic power translates into correspondingly powerful capacity for 
regulatory arbitrage.”). 
13 Marian (2017), p 7 n 44. 
14 Drucker J, Bowers S (2017) After a tax crackdown, Apple found a new shelter for its profits. NY Times, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/06/world/apple-taxes-jersey.html. 
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 Other tech giants similarly garnered attention for their strategies. Amazon’s 
controversial avoidance of sales tax for the first fifteen years of its existence gave it an 8-
10% price advantage over local retailers.15 In advance of the EU’s General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR), Facebook modified its terms and conditions so that data 
from 1.5 billion of its users, previously managed from its European office in Ireland to 
benefit from low corporate tax rates, would instead be handled by its U.S. headquarters 
which falls under less strict privacy laws.16 Google and other companies with digital 
business models may soon be subject to a new tax on revenues from the European 
Commission and the U.K. Treasury, which aims to rectify previous characterizations of 
technology products and services such as digital advertising as lacking a physical 
presence for tax purposes.17 
 Understanding the constraints and limits on regulatory arbitrage has become 
increasingly important. This essay explores this topic through the lens of the technology 
industry, known for its adaptiveness and access to strategic resources. Some applications 
of regulatory arbitrage such as aggressive tax planning are generalizable to a variety of 
businesses but the ability to use technology to design around regulation and to take 
advantage of legal categorizations also enables different expressions of regulatory 
arbitrage, which make the tech industry a particularly rich area of scholarly focus.18    
																																																								
15 Khan (2017), n 204. 
16 Facebook to exclude billions from European privacy laws, BBC (April 19, 2018), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-43822184. 
17 See Cui (2018).  
18 See, e.g., Wu (2003) (discussing how code is used to avoid the law and seek legal advantage); Eler and 
Henrekson (2016) (discussing “profit-driven business activity in the market aimed at circumventing the 
existing institutional framework by using innovations to exploit contradictions in that framework”). 
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 This essay offers new insight into limits on regulatory arbitrage. It begins with a 
brief look at definitions of regulatory arbitrage and related terms, as well as examples 
from the tech world. Next, it examines constraints and limits on regulatory arbitrage, 
starting from discussions in existing literature and then moving to new ground. 
Specifically, it explores social license and the bundling of laws and resources as 
constraining forces on regulatory arbitrage, and the legal mismatch that can arise from 
new business models and innovations as a key area in which the limits of regulatory 
arbitrage can be observed.  
 First, the discussion demonstrates that aggressive regulatory arbitrage can erode 
social license and create a more costly environment for sustainable operation.19 
Particularly when regulatory arbitrage creates social costs that are widely observed, social 
opprobrium from the public can affect whether, and the extent to which, such a strategy is 
a valuable course of action to pursue or continue. 
 Second, although a company might be able to arbitrage a particular law, the 
opportunity arises not in isolation but within a system of laws and in light of other needs 
and preferences such as investment capital, workforce talent, brand value, and personal 
benefits for executives that may constrain the decision. The more that laws can be 
discretely chosen, the greater potential for regulatory arbitrage. And conversely, the 
greater the extent to which a law is bundled, the less room there may be for regulatory 
arbitrage to function as a valuable strategy.  
																																																								
19 Social license refers to the “social approval of those affected by a certain business activity.” Melé and 
Armengou (2016); see also Sale (forthcoming 2020). The concept draws upon the notion of business as a 
social institution that requires legitimacy from stakeholders. For further discussion, see Part 3.1 infra. 
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 Third, in some instances, gaps or differences in laws exist but are part of a 
regulatory environment that is generally prohibitive for certain kinds of new business 
models or innovations to operate on a global scale, which gives rise to a need to change 
the laws rather than simply arbitrage them. Alternative strategies may offer more 
promising outcomes for new business models or innovations and highlight that the gains 
from regulatory arbitrage can be limited in these circumstances.  
2.  Regulatory Arbitrage  
2.1.  Definitions 
 Regulatory arbitrage has been variously defined, but the term consistently 
includes the notion of manipulation or strategic design of an activity to take advantage of 
specific legal or regulatory treatment. For example, as noted above, in writing about 
financial derivatives, Frank Partnoy defines regulatory arbitrage as: “transactions 
designed specifically to reduce costs or capture profit opportunities created by different 
regulations or laws.”20 He connects the term to the concept of arbitrage in modern finance 
generally, in which a party “may use a variety of different trading strategies in order to 
achieve the same economically-equivalent position.”21  
 Similarly, Victor Fleischer defines regulatory arbitrage as “the manipulation of 
the structure of a deal to take advantage of a gap between the economic substance of a 
transaction and its regulatory treatment.”22 He provides the example of a company that 
																																																								
20 Partnoy (1997), p 227. 
21 Ibid.; see also Riles (2014), p 69 (“[A]rbitrage is about exploiting formal differences, despite the 
functional similarity of products across different markets owing to the interrelationship of markets.”). 
22 Fleischer (2010), p 230. 
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would minimize agency costs by incorporating in Delaware but instead decides to save 
on taxes by incorporating in Bermuda.23 At core, the economic substance of the company 
is the same, but it has exploited legal differences regarding taxation to its benefit. 
Fleischer notes, “[s]o long as the regulatory savings outweigh the increase in transaction 
costs, such planning is perfectly rational.”24 Regulatory costs are engineered, not fixed or 
exogenous—and the implications of this reality are significant for wide-ranging areas of 
law such as antitrust, banking, securities, and tax.25  
 Scholars have also identified that distinct kinds of regulatory arbitrage exist. 
Jurisdictional arbitrage, as the name suggests, takes advantage of differences in laws from 
different jurisdictions.26 By contrast, categorical arbitrage exploits a legal discrepancy 
between the treatment of two types of activity or products that are functionally similar.27 
This could occur within the same jurisdiction by structuring conduct so that it achieves 
the same substantive result but falls under law A instead of law B to save on regulatory 
costs. As Annelise Riles explains, arbitrage as a mode of thinking appreciates “both 
similarities and differences, all at once.”28 One can take advantage of a difference in 
																																																								
23 Ibid. at p 231; Bruner (2016), pp 30-38 (discussing capital mobility and regulatory competition); cf. 
Talley, p 1653 (arguing that “[f]ederal law’s creeping displacement of state law has consequently 
‘unbundled’ domestic tax law from domestic corporate governance regulation” in the U.S.). For a 
discussion of “how offshore jurisdictions enable business entities to opt out of otherwise mandatory 
domestic regulatory laws,” see Moon (2019), pp 1-2. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. at pp 232-234; see also Burk (2016), pp 6-7 (“[Exploitation of loopholes] happens routinely, in all 
areas of social activity, producing unexpected and often undesired outcomes as regulation changes behavior 
in unanticipated ways.”); Wu (2003), pp 682-683 (describing code as a technological mechanism to 
minimize the burden of laws). 
26 Riles (2014), p 71. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., p 72. 
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jurisdictions or legal categorization while functionally engaging in the same activity. In 
her words, “What distinguishes regulatory arbitrage is simply that all relevant differences 
are differences of law or regulatory practice.”29 
 Others would slice regulatory arbitrage in different ways than by jurisdiction and 
legal categorization. Kristelia García suggests this dichotomy: “(1) ontological—i.e., the 
manipulation of a statutory definition so as to either avoid regulatory scrutiny, or to 
benefit from preferential statutory treatment; and (2) exploitative—i.e., the utilization of a 
regulation for purposes at odds with the statute’s purported legislative intent.”30 She 
illustrates the first with Pandora’s purchase of a terrestrial radio station in order to 
recategorize itself from a digital radio platform to a mixed-use company and lower its 
regulatory costs for public performance royalties.31 The applicable statute does not 
expressly prohibit this conduct but it also doesn’t contemplate internet radio stations 
doing this to manipulate their royalty rate. An example of the latter category, exploitative 
arbitrage, according to García, is a content owner’s issuance of a baseless or inaccurate 
takedown notice of alleged infringement—misusing the mechanism under U.S. copyright 
law for purposes not envisioned, such as improperly forcing the removal of negative 
reviews about a company or product.32  
 A host of other terminology in the literature also adds color and depth to 
descriptions and reminds that technical definitions of regulatory arbitrage are perhaps of 
																																																								
29 Ibid.  
30 García (2019), p 203; see also Burk, pp 15-16 (discussing technological and ontological avoision). 
31 García (2019), p 203. 
32 Ibid., pp 203, 237-238. 
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less importance than the notions of circumvention and strategic legal avoidance more 
generally.33 Whether an actor exploits a loophole or decides to order their affairs to avoid 
a particular law is arguably in the same general class of conduct and it is a contextual 
matter whether it is tolerable within the bounds of the law or poses a problem, for 
example by placing social or economic activity that impacts a jurisdiction beyond its 
regulatory reach.34 
2.2.  Examples 
 
 To inquire, as this essay does, into limits on regulatory arbitrage is not to 
underestimate or diminish the very substantial amount of this activity that is occurring. 
Examples in the realm of technology abound. To underscore this point, it is worth briefly 
considering a few. 
 Some regulatory arbitrage by tech companies is in the vein of the discussion 
above, such as a tax inversion in which a corporation relocates its legal domicile to a 
lower-tax country, while retaining material operations in higher-tax locations. Facebook’s 
changing of its terms and conditions to shift the regulatory treatment of its users for 
purposes of privacy laws is a variant. But examples in technology also include 
																																																								
33 See Katz (2010) (discussing circumvention of law and related other phrases such as evasion, avoidance, 
and loophole exploitation, as well as more context-specific examples such as tax shelters and 
bootstrapping, and forum-shopping); see also Moon (2019), n 7 (“Scholars typically distinguish tax 
evasion, a set of illicit activities aimed at reducing taxes, from tax avoidance, which includes various forms 
of legal maneuvering.”).  
34 In some instances, regulatory arbitrage or legal avoidance may result in an unexpected benefit or may 
mitigate regulation driven by special interests. For example, some regulatory arbitrage “may serve as an 
impetus for technological innovation, or may signal to Congress an extant imbalance in statutory treatment 
of similarly situated entities, potentially resulting in societal benefit on balance.” García (2019), p 203; see 
also Burk (2016), pp 3-5 (describing serendipitous technology as “perverse innovation” that is a byproduct 
of regulatory avoidance such as the development of mutagenic crops to avoid strict GMO regulation); 
Ayres and Kapczynski (2015), pp 1812-1827 (describing innovation to avoid or lessen the impact of a 
penalty such as the development of energy-efficient cars and light bulbs). 
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innovations—products or services—that are designed to exploit legal classifications or 
exist in legal gray areas and rely on other forms of arbitrage such as geographical 
evasion. The music jukebox of the 1920s, for example, exploited an exception to the 
public performance right of copyright law regarding “coin-operated machines” that was 
intended for operators of penny arcades.35  
 More recently, in the Wild West of the 1990s and early 2000s internet, peer-
music-sharing protocols evolved in ways that demonstrated arbitrage through both design 
and jurisdiction choices. Gnutella designed its file-sharing technology “on concepts of 
radical decentralization” to try to avoid the legal problems that led to Napster’s demise.36 
The Gnutella design facilitated copyright infringement, as Napster had with its service, 
but unlike Napster it had virtually no intermediaries and the file-sharing network was 
“unowned and uncontrolled.”37 Its decentralized design allowed it to avoid legal liability, 
but it also had stability and performance problems that led to yet another generation of 
peer music file-sharing software such as Kazaa. Like Gnutella, the new generation 
avoided the centralized control that doomed Napster, but reintroduced some element of 
hierarchy that allowed for performance and scale. Scandinavian entrepreneurs founded 
Kazaa in the Netherlands and, after litigation there, engaged in “jurisdictional exit,” 
selling the application to a company that incorporated in Vanuatu, a small island in the 
South Pacific that lacked a copyright law.38 The popularity of these music-sharing 
																																																								
35 García (2019), p 202. 
36 Wu (2003), p 731. 
37 Ibid., p 732. 
38 Ibid., p 736; Wu (2017), p10. 
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services was eventually overtaken by the launch of sites with legal legitimacy such as 
Apple iTunes. 
 In the twenty-first century, one of the most notable examples of regulatory 
arbitrage in the tech industry involves ride-hailing company Uber and other “gig” or 
“sharing” economy companies that have organized their affairs to use workers they 
categorize as non-employees.39 Employee classification implicates a number of areas of 
law such as labor, taxation, public accommodation, and more.40 Uber and others 
characterize themselves as technology companies that connect users and service 
providers, such as riders and drivers—shaping their narrative as platforms rather than as 
principal providers of services through the use of employees. A platform intermediates a 
transaction on demand between customers and workers, by reducing search costs, 
providing information about reliability and other characteristics, and providing a digital 
infrastructure for the transaction to take place such as matching and clearing payments.41 
Platforms may represent a “transaction costs revolution”42 but the business model quite 
critically also hinges on regulatory arbitrage—credible characterizations about legal 
ambiguities in employee status that allow companies to avoid the regulatory costs of a 
broad range of laws.43 Platform companies provide an important example that sets the 
stage for the next part of discussion. 
																																																								
39 Oei (2018). 
40 Ibid., pp 109, 120-121. 
41 Prassl (2018), pp 19-20; Lobel (2016). 
42 Lobel (2016), p 106. 
43 Ibid., p 156 (“[D]efinitional defiance is central to the business model of the platform.”); Tommassetti 
(2016), p 78 (“[C]laims about technological sophistication and the knowledge economy can be euphemisms 
for profit seeking not through productive enterprise, but through regulatory arbitrage, speculation, and other 
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3.  Constraints 
 
 In any legal system there will be some circumvention, some exploitation of 
differences or loopholes, and some strategic choices between jurisdictions.44 To speak in 
general terms, the technology industry engages in no small amount of this conduct and 
even pursues entrepreneurial opportunities in this realm, sometimes testing legal 
boundaries. But we can also observe that there are some limiting forces or constraints. 
 Scant literature has pursued this line of inquiry.45 In the most notable work to do 
so, Victor Fleischer sets out a taxonomy of five constraints on regulatory arbitrage: “(1) 
legal constraints, (2) Coasean transaction costs, (3) professional constraints, (4) ethical 
constraints, and (5) political constraints.”46 Fleischer explores these constraints as an 
explanation for why many sophisticated deals are structured in a way that does not 
optimally minimize transaction costs as theory would suggest—one of his key insights 
was that deal planning involves tradeoffs when attempting to minimize both regulatory 
costs and transaction costs.47 Constraints to regulatory arbitrage therefore affect a 
company’s ability to reduce overall costs in its business affairs. 
 In Fleischer’s analysis, legal constraints refer to “antiplanning rules” in statutory 
schemes such as anti-avoidance sections, “look-through” or “catch-all” provisions, and 
																																																								
forms of asset manipulation.”). This process is dynamic and the law responds in turn, such as by 
developing new statutes and case law on the issue of employee status. 
44 See Katz (2010). 
45 For a classic work that considers the complexity and limits of financial arbitrage in the real world given 
that it requires capital and entails risk, particularly in the agency context, see Shleifer and Vishny (1997).  
46 Fleischer (2010), p 230.  
47 Ibid., pp 231-232. 
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statutory tests regarding economic substance.48 Drawing on the “frictions” concept in the 
tax-planning literature, Fleischer explains that transaction costs include “the costs 
associated with market transactions, including search costs, asymmetric information 
between the buyer and the seller, bargaining costs, moral hazard and other instances of 
strategic behavior, and monitoring or enforcement costs.”49 Professional and ethical 
constraints pertain to considerations about maintaining reputational capital as a lawyer 
and law firm, and abiding moral obligations when advising clients about legal but 
aggressive strategies.50 Fleischer notes that in reality the question of these professional 
and ethical constraints “almost seems quaint” and they may be “almost trivial” in practice 
since regulatory arbitrage is commonplace.51  Finally, the last constraint in his taxonomy 
is political costs, which he says “are best understood in the context of corporations’ long-
term involvement in the political process.”52 Fleischer focuses primarily on the political 
capital required for sophisticated deal participants to navigate getting government 
approval or favorable regulatory treatment of a complex transaction such as in tax or 
mergers and acquisitions.53  
																																																								
48 Ibid., p 252-253; see also Buell (2011) (describing good faith doctrines as serving a similar anti-
avoidance function); Blank and Staudt (2012), p 1645 (discussing anti-abuse standards and examining 
judicial responses to “technically legal activities that may be perceived as shams”). 
49 Fleischer (2010), p 258. 
50 Ibid., pp 262-274. 
51 Ibid., pp 252, 264; cf. Barry (2011), p 71 (noting that “professional constraints are by no means a perfect 
prevention mechanism,” but they “do shift deals between different structures and [this] can affect the 
degree of regulatory arbitrage”).  
52 Fleischer (2010), p 273. 
53 Ibid., pp 283-288 (discussing “the politics of the deal”). 
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 This section turns now to extending this discussion of constraints by examining 
three additional categories of considerations that might be managed in decisions about 
engaging in regulatory arbitrage: social license, the bundling of laws and resources, and 
alternative strategies for new business models and innovations. 
3.1.  Social License 
 
 The public and governmental responses to Uber around the world have provided 
an interesting laboratory for watching the concept of social license at work. As a case 
study, Uber illustrates that social license is a related but separate force than the political 
constraint that Professor Fleischer identified. Whereas politics in his taxonomy concerned 
the political capital that a company cultivates and relies upon to seek a particular deal 
approval or regulatory outcome, social license operates more broadly as it comes from 
the public and is generated by trustworthy behavior and moral legitimacy.54  
 Social license, developed in the sociology and business ethics literature, refers to 
the concept that business exists by virtue of permission from communities and 
stakeholders.55 Businesses are social institutions, as well as economic firms, and are 
subject to public accountability.56 Imported into the business law literature by Hillary 
Sale, social license is understood as a necessary condition for business to exist just like a 
legal license to operate.57 This concept shares roots in notions of a social contract and an 
																																																								
54 Sale (forthcoming 2020). 
55 See, e.g., Melé and Armengou (2016); Demuijnck and Fasterling (2016); Wilburn and Wilburn (2011). 
56 Sale (forthcoming 2020). 
57 Sale (forthcoming 2020). 
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understanding that when business fails to meet public expectations, a “loss of prestige, 
public standing and popular esteem” can follow that imposes costs on the business.58  
 Uber lost its social license, and then like a domino, its legal license to operate in 
London after a series of scandals at the company in 2017.59 This episode highlights the 
potential that if a company engages in overt, aggressive regulatory arbitrage, particularly 
in combination with a culture that violates other public norms, a company may be reined 
in from continuing to pursue its activity.  
 Founded in 2009, Uber grew rapidly in cities around the world, gaining popularity 
among customers who enjoyed the low prices and convenience of the smartphone app. 
Uber’s customers benefited from its willingness to engage in regulatory arbitrage by 
receiving low pricing relative to taxis, enabled by categorizing workers as independent 
contractors rather than employees (and avoiding taxi medallion regulation). But 
customers also embraced Uber, and its main competitor Lyft, for other reasons as well 
such as the user-friendly interface, widespread availability even in suburban areas, and 
quality of service driven by customer-rating systems.60 With this formula of gains from 
																																																								
58 See Berle  (1959), pp 90-91, 114; see also Cheffins (2018-2019) (discussing mid-twentieth century 
notions of “countervailing power” on corporations); Pollman (2019), pp 634-39 (discussing Adolf Berle’s 
concept of “inchoate law” that arises when corporations fail to self-regulate within expected social norms 
of responsibility). 
59 See Volpicelli G (2018) Uber’s London licence has been approved – but there’s a big catch. Wired, 
https://www.wired.co.uk/article/uber-london-licence-tfl-verdict; Satariano A (2018) Uber regains its 
license to operate in London, a win for its new C.E.O. NY Times, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/technology/uber-london.html. 
60 Lobel (2016), p 157 (“[T]he economic and social logic of the platform, pushing down transaction costs in 
all stages of the deal, as well as creating new markets that map onto new preferences and lifestyles, is the 
primary raison d'être of the rise of the platform.”); Stone B (2017) The $99 Billion Idea, Bloomberg, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2017-uber-airbnb-99-billion-idea/ (describing Uber’s philosophy, 
“our product is so superior to the status quo that if we give people the opportunity to see it or try it, in any 
place in the world where government has to be at least somewhat responsive to the people, they will 
demand it and defend its right to exist”). 
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regulatory arbitrage plus a differentiated service that customers wanted, and aggressive 
regulatory entrepreneurship discussed further below, the company grew to a private 
valuation of $69 billion by 2016.61 
 By 2017, however, Uber had already been plagued by a number of scandals and 
its combative approach to regulatory arbitrage was in plain view to the public, with 
protests around the globe. The year started with #DeleteUber, a social media campaign to 
boycott the company for continuing to operate after taxi drivers had called for a 
temporary boycott at New York’s JFK Airport to protest President Trump’s travel ban to 
several countries with Muslim majorities.62 Many people viewed Uber’s act of continuing 
to give rides, and turning off surge pricing, as an anti-labor attempt to profit from the taxi 
drivers’ strike.63 Also in early 2017, Uber drivers in India went on strike to protest falling 
fare rates and decreased driver incentives from the company.64  
 Additionally, among other controversies, it came to light that Uber had secretly 
developed a software tool it called “Greyball” to evade law enforcement agencies that 
were trying to crack down on its service.65 Further, Uber was hit with a lawsuit from 
																																																								
61 MacMillan D (2016) Uber raises $3.5 billion from Saudi Fund, Wall Street Journal, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/uberraises-3-5-billion-from-saudi-fund-1464816529. 




64 Ram A, Kazmin A (2017) Uber’s Indian drivers strike for fourth day over earnings squeeze, Financial 
Times, https://www.ft.com/content/9653ace2-f1d9-11e6-8758-6876151821a6. 
65 The Greyball tool was part of a Uber program called VTOS, short for “violation of terms of service.” It 
used data collected from the Uber app and other techniques to identify riders that it viewed as using or 
targeting its service improperly, such as public officials who were posing as customers to investigate or 
gather evidence that Uber was operating illegally. The tool showed such riders a fake version of the app 
and blocked them from booking rides. Isaac M (2017) How Uber deceives the authorities worldwide, NY 
Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/technology/uber-greyball-program-evade-authorities.html;  
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Google’s self-driving car unit, Waymo, regarding the alleged theft of trade secrets.66 In 
addition, an Uber engineer published a blog post exposing a culture of gender 
discrimination and sexual harassment at the company.67  
 By several months later, additional scandals had mounted regarding its processes 
for vetting drivers and reporting crimes to the police, and subsequently the Transport for 
London (TfL) decided not to grant Uber a new Private Hire Vehicle Operator’s License 
for the city, Uber’s most valuable European market. In its decision, the TfL stated it was 
not satisfied that Uber was a “fit and proper person to hold a licence.”68 The cited basis 
for this decision was the Greyball tool, which “can be deployed for a variety of legitimate 
purposes, though some companies within the Uber group have used it for purposes of 
evading regulatory enforcement in other jurisdictions.”69 In addition, as a separate and 
sufficient basis for the denial, Uber “demonstrated a lack of corporate responsibility in 
relation to a number of other issues which have potential public safety implications.”70 
 In response, the new Uber CEO at the time, Dara Khosrowshahi, issued a “Dear 
Londoners” public apology in the Evening Standard, acknowledging mistakes and stating 
that the company had to change to be “long-term partners with the cities we serve” and 
																																																								
Isaac M (2017) Justice department expands its inquiry into Uber’s greyball tool, NY Times, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/05/technology/uber-greyball-investigation-expands.html. 
66 Duhigg C (2018) Did Uber steal Google’s intellectual property?, New Yorker, 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/22/did-uber-steal-googles-intellectual-property. 
67 Dowd M (2017) She’s 26, and brought down Uber’s C.E.O. What’s next?, NY Times, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/21/style/susan-fowler-uber.html. 
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“run our business with humility, integrity and passion.”71 Khosrowshahi also noted that 
the company had already started “doing more to contribute to the city” such as providing 
wheelchair accessible vehicles and launching a clean air initiative.72 By 2018, the 
company won an appeal to regain its license after agreeing to install new executive 
leadership in London, implement systems for reporting alleged crimes, share traffic data 
with the city, and submit to an independent board to oversee British operations.73 During 
testimony, the TfL’s director of licensing explained, “We’ve had five years of a very 
difficult relationship where Uber felt it didn’t require regulation.”74 In rendering the 
decision on appeal, the Westminster Magistrates’ Court granted a shorter license than 
normal and stated that Uber had to prove that it “can be trusted.”75 
 Similarly, in other cities in which Uber won early battles, cracks in the social 
license manifest as new constraints and mechanisms for accountability. For example, 
although Uber triumphed over a 2015 attempt by New York’s mayor, Bill de Blasio, to 
squash its growth, this was only a temporary respite. Just a few years later, in 2018, the 
New York City Council succeeded in passing legislation that limits the number of ride-
share vehicles in the city so there would not be further growth.76 Further, the city passed 
																																																								
71 Crerar P (2017) Uber boss Dara Khosrowshahi says sorry and promises to ‘make things right’ for 




73 Satariano (2018), supra. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Wolfe J, Levine, AS (2018) New York today: capping Uber, NY Times, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/15/nyregion/new-york-today-sunglasses-eye-safety.html. 
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legislation that created a minimum wage for drivers, bumping up driver’s pay by about 
23 percent on average—a move that traditional yellow-cab drivers welcomed to reduce 
their competition and increase income—and effectively reducing the gain from 
arbitraging the employee classification.77 
  In all, the Uber example suggests that when a company pushes too hard on 
regulatory arbitrage and uses tools of “avoision” to evade enforcement and oversight, it 
can impact social license and result in a more difficult environment for sustainable 
operation. This is particularly likely when the regulatory arbitrage is of the “exploitative” 
variety or is combined with other activity that transgresses norms or community values. 
Because regulatory arbitrage can be commonly perceived in a negative light by the 
public—as circumventing obligations to society or unfairly taking advantage of 
loopholes—its propensity to trigger a loss of social license may be greater than other 
forms of business decisions more generally. 
 The costs that result from a loss of social license are hard to calculate. Uber’s 
stumbles in navigating public backlash created pressure for governance changes, 
additional governmental oversight, and opened up opportunity for its competitors such as 
Lyft to gain market share.78 Failing to manage the ingredients for social license such as 
trust and credibility could also affect the likelihood of enforcement, litigation, and rulings 
regarding regulatory arbitrage strategies. For example, the largest class action in 
Australian history has recently been filed against Uber for “conspiracy to act unlawfully” 
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by over a thousand taxi drivers from multiple Australian states, seeking $500 million, and 
with the class size expected to grow to tens of thousands of plaintiffs.79 From an ex ante 
decisionmaking perspective, as companies engage in risk management and cost-benefit 
analysis regarding legal strategy, they should also consider the potential for social license 
to operate as a constraint on the successful pursuit of regulatory arbitrage.  
 We might also observe that for social license to function in this way, a certain 
amount of openness or transparency must exist such that the public sees the regulatory 
arbitrage and reacts. If a particular instance of regulatory arbitrage is viewed as an 
appropriate response to overly burdensome regulation, or is carried out by a company that 
offers a product or service that is embraced by consumers, regulatory arbitrage may incur 
little or no public pushback and may even receive support. By contrast, if regulatory 
arbitrage creates significant social costs that are apparent to the public, social opprobrium 
can kick in and stop the activity or make it more costly to engage in the arbitrage. This 
result may not always follow or provide a timely and effective constraint, but in 
situations when the public does have information and the will to push back against 
corporate activity, this response can trigger a range of costs in the form of new 
governance obligations and regulations, loss of customers, and the like. Given the 
importance of information for social license to operate as a constraint, the government 
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and media have a role to play in bringing attention to egregious and socially harmful 
instances of regulatory arbitrage.80  
 Furthermore, research on corporate reputation may hold insights for how social 
license functions as a constraint on regulatory arbitrage. Corporate reputation research 
suggests that when a firm harms its customers, the firm will suffer a loss of market 
reputation and internalize this cost.81 As both social license and corporate reputation are 
similarly based on notions of trustworthy behavior and moral legitimacy, this dynamic of 
harm to customers may similarly help predict when regulatory arbitrage will incur a loss 
of social license. For example, when a company engages in regulatory arbitrage that cuts 
corners in compliance and results in harm to customer or user safety, we might expect the 
company to pay a price in terms of social license, particularly if the company is 
consumer-facing rather than business-to-business. In addition, corporate reputation 
research suggests that harm to third parties might not result in the same loss to market 
reputation as does harm to customers, but when media brings attention to the issue it 
could nonetheless impact a company’s political reputation which could in turn increase 
the likelihood of government investigation or enforcement action.82  
 Finally, the strength of social license as a constraint may vary by company, 
industry, community, and across different time periods.83 Social license may also take on 
																																																								
80 For a related discussion of “publicness” as a mechanism by which citizens, media, other outside actors 
control public perception and can push for information and public accountability, see Sale (2013); Sale 
(2011); Langevoort and Thompson (2013). 
81 Armour, Enriques, Ezrachi, and Vella (2018), p 10. 
82 Ibid. 
83 For a discussion of the history of the relationship between corporate law and social welfare, see Bratton 
(2017). 
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greater importance when other institutions, such as court systems and regulatory 
agencies, are overburdened, hobbled by outdated legal frameworks, or in a state of flux.84 
There are signs that the pendulum may be swinging toward a stronger awareness of the 
importance of social license in current times. For example, in 2019, Larry Fink, the 
founder and chief executive of BlackRock, the world’s largest institutional investor with 
more than $6 trillion under management, wrote an open letter to CEOs reminding them of 
the historical “social compact” that has existed in many companies between stakeholders 
and corporations, and encouraged companies to embrace a greater responsibility.85 In his 
previous annual letter, he had similarly highlighted the changing social and political 
environment: “Society is demanding that companies, both public and private, serve a 
social purpose. To prosper over time, every company must not only deliver financial 
performance, but also show how it makes a positive contribution to society.”86 If a 
company fails in this regard, “[i]t will ultimately lose the license to operate from key 
stakeholders.”87   
 The stronger awareness of social license not only applies to the general business 
environment, as Larry Fink’s letters suggest, but is particularly acute in recent times with 
respect to the tech industry. The rise of “big tech,” and in particular the size, market 
dominance, and potential social dangers of Apple, Alphabet, Amazon, and Facebook, 
																																																								
84 See Cohen (2017), p 176 (describing how “[p]latform companies are encountering legal systems 
worldwide at a time of crisis”). 
85 Larry Fink’s 2019 letter to CEOs: purpose & profit, BlackRock, 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter.  
86 Larry Fink’s 2018 letter to CEOs: a sense of purpose, BlackRock, 
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have provoked a public backlash and global conversation about how to rein in the power 
of these companies.88 In this environment, a loss of social license from regulatory 
arbitrage could be triggered more quickly or have potentially larger magnitude in terms 
of costs. For some companies such as Facebook, user trust is essential to its economic 
and political power, and the loss of trust or social legitimacy poses an existential threat to 
its business model.89 Given the specter of additional regulation already looming, 
companies in this business environment might view social license as a more salient 
constraint on aggressive maneuvering around the law. 
3.2.  Bundling of Laws and Resources 
 
 A second constraint to regulatory arbitrage that deserves greater examination 
concerns the way in which opportunities arise in legal systems and with other interests at 
stake.90 We can explore this point by looking at where technology companies choose to 
locate headquarters and important centers of development. 
 In recent times, regulatory competition has heated up as jurisdictions fight to 
become centers of technology development in an era in which economic growth is fueled 
by innovation. Just a few years ago, venture capitalist Marc Andreessen advocated for 
this competitive approach through deregulatory programs: “Think of it as a sort of ‘global 
arbitrage’ around permissionless innovation — the freedom to create new technologies 
																																																								
88 See, e.g., McNamee (2019); Zuboff (2019); Wu (2018); Khan (2017); Galloway (2017). 
89 See Osnos E (2018), How much trust can Facebook afford to lose?, New Yorker, 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/how-much-trust-can-facebook-afford-to-lose; Harvard 
Business Review (2019), Can Mark Zuckerberg rebuild trust in Facebook?, 
https://hbr.org/podcast/2019/04/can-mark-zuckerberg-rebuild-trust-in-facebook. 
90 For a discussion of this point in the context of economist Charles Tiebout’s model of jurisdictional 
competition, see Bratton and McCahery (1997).  For a discussion of the tax “frictions” literature, see 
Fleischer (2010), pp 232-233, 258. 
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without having to ask the powers that be for their blessing.”91 In his vision, there would 
be a Bitcoin Valley, where a jurisdiction had fully legalized cryptocurrency for all 
purposes, and a Drone Valley, that removed all legal obstacles to unmanned aerial 
vehicles, and so on by technology. Since that time, innovation clusters or hubs have 
emerged and while they are permissive, they are not entirely permissionless. Andreessen 
correctly observed that the relaxation of rules and the creation of innovation-friendly 
programs was starting to transform certain cities and diffuse technology development.   
 The rollout of Google Fiber in the past decade provides a useful illustration of the 
competitive dynamic. In 2009, the U.S. Congress charged the Federal Communications 
Commission with developing a National Broadband Plan to expand high-speed internet 
service, but it relied significantly on private investment.92 Google recognized the 
importance of advancing the fiber-based infrastructure to enable other technology such as 
autonomous vehicles, smart grids, advanced health technology and more.93 When Google 
announced it would build a small number of experimental infrastructure projects for 
broadband, fiber-based high-speed internet, it expected 10 to 50 proposals and instead 
received 1,100 proposals from cities competing for the technology.94 This represented a 
reversal from the traditional model in which telecommunications companies competed to 
																																																								
91 Andreessen M (2014) What it will take to create the next great Silicon Valleys, plural, Andreessen 
Horowitz, https://a16z.com/2014/06/20/what-it-will-take-to-create-the-next-great-silicon-valleys-plural/; 
see also Thierer (2016) (discussing innovation and regulatory competition). 
92 Levin B, Downes L (2018) Why Google Fiber is high-speed internet’s most successful failure, Harvard 
Business Review, https://hbr.org/2018/09/why-google-fiber-is-high-speed-internets-most-successful-
failure. 
93 Ibid. (“[G]oogle’s own interest in fiber stemmed from a conviction that faster speeds would eventually 
generate more revenue and services for the broader Alphabet enterprise, making the investment justifiable 
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94 Ibid. 
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get permission to operate in a particular city—instead it was cities that competed to get 
Google Fiber and they showed up in huge numbers.95 The cities most attractive to Google 
offered administrative efficiency to reduce costs, time, and political frictions that would 
slow installation.96 Once Google demonstrated that an environment existed of cities 
willing to work with private industry players, incumbents such as AT&T, Comcast, and 
Time Warner subsequently prioritized deployments of broadband internet as well.97 
 Other examples highlight the clustering of technology development occurring in 
jurisdictions that have styled themselves through permissive regulation as hubs for 
drones, fintech, and autonomous vehicles. For instance, in 2013, Amazon revealed plans 
for a new drone-delivery service called Amazon Prime Air, and subsequently moved its 
drone research and development from the U.S. to the Canadian border and the U.K. 
Around this time, the relevant U.S. regulatory body, the Federal Aviation Administration, 
had restrictive rules on unmanned aerial activity and long waits for permits to engage in 
drone testing.98 It was not until 2018, after a rebuke from the National Academies of 
Sciences for holding back progress, that Congress ordered the FAA to take a more 
permissive “risk-based approach” to regulating drones, but by then other jurisdictions had 
the first-mover advantage and had attracted key innovators.99 
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 Similarly, in 2016, the U.K.’s Financial Conduct Authority pioneered a 
“regulatory sandbox” that allows fintech startups to conduct a limited test of their 
products with reduced regulatory constraints and risk of enforcement action.100 Australia, 
Canada, Singapore, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, and others have followed suit 
in adopting their own versions.101 The early moving jurisdictions have attracted a 
significant amount of fintech activity. Likewise with respect to autonomous vehicles, 
certain jurisdictions—the U.S., Germany, the U.K., and the Netherlands—were pioneers 
for licensing that enables testing and have become hotbeds for technology development. 
Even within jurisdictions, competitive federalism thrives—for example, Arizona and 
California became the first two U.S. states to allow autonomous vehicles to operate on 
public roads without drivers and have attracted the lion’s share of companies developing 
this technology.102 
 Decisions do not only reflect unfettered arbitrage and competition, however. 
Although in isolation a particular law might be efficiently arbitraged, in the fuller picture 
these laws arise in systems and with individuals who have personal benefits and 
preferences as well. How else might one explain the decision of technology companies to 
launch, establish headquarters, and expand in some of the most expensive regions in the 
world such as the San Francisco Bay Area, New York, and Seattle? 
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101 See id.; see also Van Loo (2018) (arguing that the U.S. lags in consumer financial technology because of 
a lack of an agency with the authority and expertise to promote consumer financial competition). 
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 A variety of factors are at play and can be thought of as constraints for certain 
decisions about arbitrage. The availability of talented human capital in a region is often a 
critical factor. Investors may be more likely to place bets on technology companies that 
are being founded nearby their own offices and in areas known for launching success 
stories. Company brand and status can also be linked to locations—just think of Apple’s 
slogan “designed in California” and its 2.8-million-square-foot futuristic mothership 
campus built in Cupertino based on Steve Jobs’ “idealized California.”103  
 Further, even with regard to laws, the constraints on arbitrage are not simply 
about anti-avoidance regimes—strategic decisions arise within legal systems that have 
other kinds of tradeoffs.104 As we have seen, Facebook backed off its regulatory arbitrage 
for tax advantages because of emergent privacy restrictions. Despite a high tax rate and 
cost of operations, innovation has flourished in California with its particular mix of laws, 
including labor law that encourages “knowledge spillovers” and facilitates employee 
mobility—and falls under U.S. law with relatively strong intellectual property 
protection.105 Bundling can act as a constraint on regulatory arbitrage to the extent a law 
is non-separable from another law or regulatory regime that offers value. 
																																																								
103 Budds D (2017) The fascinating history of “Designed in California,” Fast Company, 
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104 See Bratton and McCahery (1997), pp 222-23 (“[I]ndividual sorting proves difficult to effect because of 
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 Extensive literature documents the benefits of the mix of these various factors—
“agglomeration” economics—and how challenging it is to manufacture these 
ecosystems.106 Some locations are difficult to arbitrage because functional substitutes do 
not exist or alternatives are simply not quite the same. 
 A related point is that private benefits can also be at stake in these location 
decisions, particularly when there is physical presence involved. Founders and corporate 
executives are likely not indifferent regarding the decision to spend significant time in 
thriving, metropolitan cities with world-class amenities versus other locations that may 
have cost efficiencies.107 Location choices implicate the vision that founders and 
executives may have for not only the company’s brand, but also for their own lifestyles, 
“personal brands,” status, and values.108 Salesforce CEO-founder Marc Benioff built the 
“Salesforce Tower,” dramatically altering the San Francisco skyline, and invested heavily 
in the community, including by giving millions of dollars and his personal support to an 
initiative to raise taxes on corporations in the city to fund homeless programs.109 He 
remarked: “San Francisco is amazing. We have these incredible companies and 
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entrepreneurs, innovation and technology, . . . and we are responsible for the city that we 
are living in and growing our businesses in.”110 The media has frequently featured his 
philanthropic efforts and speculated about whether the tech billionaire might have 
personal ambitions in politics.111 
 The Amazon second headquarters competition also provides an interesting 
illustration of these points. The company created a tournament for its attention, 
announcing a nationwide search and seemingly stoking regulatory competition for its 
“business” of bringing jobs to a community.112 Out of many cities offering lucrative 
deals, the company chose to develop new headquarters in the Washington DC and New 
York metro areas—two of the most expensive U.S. cities. Yet these cities offer bundled 
resources—“agglomeration” benefits including large talent pools, big-city lifestyles and 
branding, as well as the potential to build political capital.113 Amazon’s founder-CEO, 
Jeff Bezos, purchased a notable mansion in DC’s well-heeled and politically-connected 
Kalorama neighborhood, minutes from the new Amazon site as well as the politicians and 
lobbyists around Capitol Hill. In a surprising twist, Amazon quickly dropped its plans for 
the New York-area site after public outcry stemming from “residents’ fears of economic 
insecurity and displacement” that might result if the tech behemoth developed a corporate 
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111 See, e.g., Zetlin M (2018), Here’s what Salesforce CEO Marc Benioff would do if he were president—
even though he’s not running, Inc., https://www.inc.com/minda-zetlin/marc-benioff-salesforce-ceo-us-
president-msnbc-kara-swisher-interview.html. 
112 For a discussion of business location tax incentives, see Enrich (1996).  
113 See Streitfeld D (2018), Was Amazon’s headquarters contest a bait-and-switch? Critics say yes. NY 
Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/technology/amazon-hq2-long-island-city-virginia.html. 
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outpost in the community114—illustrating that both social license and bundling issues 
were at play in the decision. And, even beyond Amazon’s second-headquarters saga, 
recent reporting has highlighted that the company has not been able to fully exert 
leverage in choosing locations for development efforts because the company cannot get 
around the fact that it needs certain locations in and near major cities in order to do 
deliveries.115 These examples demonstrate that while tech companies might use tax 
inversions and havens for some assets, especially if not subject to public transparency and 
pushback, they will not fully exit jurisdictions that have a gravitational pull for other 
reasons. 
3.3. Alternative Strategies for New Business Models and Innovations 
 
 Finally, a third constraining force on regulatory arbitrage is the presence of 
alternative strategies for interacting with and responding to the law. Regulatory arbitrage 
can be broadly understood as one type of business decision or approach to the law, 
whether it is designing a particular transaction to take advantage of a loophole or 
selecting a location for economic activity based on a favorable legal regime. Some laws 
have differences or gaps that provide entrepreneurial opportunities and make regulatory 
arbitrage an attractive strategy, but others present obstacles that limit the ability of a 
company to lawfully operate or grow. In particular, when a fundamental mismatch exists 
between new business models or innovations and laws, regulatory arbitrage may get a 
																																																								
114 De Blasio B (2019) Bill de Blasio: The path Amazon rejected. NY Times, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/16/opinion/amazon-new-york-bill-de-
blasio.html?action=click&module=Opinion&pgtype=Homepage#commentsContainer. 
115 Weise K, et al. (2019), Amazon’s hard bargain extends far beyond New York. NY Times, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/03/technology/amazon-new-york-politics-
jobs.html?action=click&module=News&pgtype=Homepage 
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company only so far toward its desired outcome. In these circumstances, an alternative 
strategy might hold more promise, and this option could affect the degree to which a 
company might attempt to arbitrage the law. 
 For example, Uber chose to “arbitrage” employee classification but to 
“entrepreneur” transportation laws. That is, Uber had at least a credible claim regarding 
employment classification law such that it could strategically design a relationship that 
arguably fit in the independent contractor status category and functionally achieved what 
the company needed from drivers.116 By contrast, taxi and transportation laws were 
different all over the world, but they were still generally prohibitive for Uber’s ride 
sharing business model when the company was in its early years. Although there may 
have been some jurisdictions that would have allowed the company to operate 
immediately and without protest, the company wanted to grow globally. The size and 
reach of the network of drivers and users impacted the company’s value, and the ability 
to scale its business was important for raising funds from venture capital investors.117 
Engaging in regulatory arbitrage by selecting only the jurisdictions that provided 
favorable legal treatment or legal gaps that could be exploited would only get the 
company a limited way toward its business goals. 
																																																								
116 As discussed above, this path has not been without cost and friction. Uber’s business model has notably 
incurred billions of dollars of losses and arbitraging employee status has led to lawsuits, settlements, and 
other expenses, leading to speculation that the company is engaged in a big bet or long game to driverless 
vehicles. See, e.g., Sherman L (2017), Why can’t Uber make money?, Forbes, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/lensherman/2017/12/14/why-cant-uber-make-money/#1253265910ec.  
117 See Pollman (2019); Coolican D, Jin L (2018) The dynamics of network effects. Andreessen Horowitz, 
https://a16z.com/2018/12/13/network-effects-dynamics-in-practice/. 
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 With some business models and innovations, or some strategies for growth, it is 
infeasible to pretend that law can be ignored, avoided, or elided altogether—it must be 
changed. Professor Jordan Barry and I have referred to this activity as “regulatory 
entrepreneurship”—where companies “pursu[e] a line of business in which changing the 
law is a significant part of the business plan.”118 Recent examples include Uber, Lyft, 
Tesla, Airbnb, among others.119 Regulatory entrepreneurship in some ways could be seen 
as a close relative to regulatory arbitrage—both involve strategic maneuvering in light of 
laws. But in other ways, regulatory arbitrage and entrepreneurship represent contrasting 
strategies that can act to constrain each other. With regulatory entrepreneurship, instead 
of trying to move around the law, exit, or recategorize, the actor is trying to change the 
law. The entrepreneur might use evasion and political techniques to do so,120 but these 
efforts are aimed at ultimately trying to shape or change the law, not work around the law 
as it stands. When circumventing the law or re-categorizing would not be sufficient or 
plausible at scale for certain business models or other innovations, regulatory 
entrepreneurship becomes a more appealing strategy. 
 To take another example, electric scooter rental companies such as Bird launched 
in multiple cities despite facing a patchwork of different laws, some silent regarding 
permissibility or even prohibitive. Electric scooters have the potential to solve the “last 
mile” problem for public transportation, taking cars off the road and thereby easing traffic 
																																																								
118 Pollman and Barry (2017), p 383. 
119 Ibid. Not all companies succeed at regulatory entrepreneurship. See, e.g., Tusk (2018), p 9 (discussing 
startup companies that failed or encountered prolonged difficulty with regulatory entrepreneurship). 
120 Pollman and Barry (2017), p 398-408 (discussing how regulatory entrepreneurs may break the law or 
operate in legal gray areas while trying to change the law, grow too big to ban, mobilize users and other 
stakeholders for political gain, and use traditional political techniques such as lobbying). 
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congestion and lowering pollution. But as the scooters are dockless and tracked by GPS, 
users can park them anywhere at the end of their ride, which can create a nuisance 
littering sidewalks. Further, scooter riders create safety hazards for pedestrians and cars 
when they inevitably fail to stay in prescribed bike lanes. Like other regulatory 
entrepreneurs, when Bird launched, it received cease and desist letters and then began 
building popular support with users and working with local regulators to make a more 
hospitable regulatory environment.121 After being pulled from the streets in some cities, 
Bird has often leveraged support from users and lobbied to come back and play by new 
rules that city officials are pressured into rolling out.122 When companies cannot simply 
engage in regulatory arbitrage to their advantage such as by moving technology 
development to an innovation cluster with permissive laws, they may instead use these 
strategies of regulatory entrepreneurship to introduce innovative technology.123 
 The success of companies engaged in regulatory entrepreneurship depends on a 
variety of legal and business factors.124 For example, a company might engage in a 
sophisticated strategy of sequencing wins in locations that can build leverage for taking 
on intransigent regulators in other important markets. To the extent that the laws targeted 
are local or state rather than federal, this strategy may be more likely to lead to a 
																																																								
121 See, e.g., Mancuso K (2019), The rise of electric scooter regulations, Regulatory Review, 
https://www.theregreview.org/2019/01/03/mancuso-electric-scooter-regulations/. 
122 See, e.g., Holley P (2018), Electric-scooter companies conquer with a simple strategy: act first, answer 
questions later, Washington Post, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2018/06/22/electric-scooter-companies-conquer-
with-a-simple-strategy-act-first-answer-questions-later/?utm_term=.03d45ad49574. 
123 See Tusk (2018). 
124 Pollman and Barry (2017), pp 410-424. 
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favorable outcome.125 Similarly, companies that can mobilize their users for political 
support are also at an advantage, particularly when dealing with regulators and legislators 
that can be held accountable by the ballot box.126 Thus, while platform companies like 
Uber and Airbnb are constrained in their ability to arbitrage the transportation and short-
term rental laws at the heart of their business models, they are well-positioned to try to 
challenge those laws by using their platform to rally their user base to exert political 
pressure, in combination with other forms of politicking.   
Conclusion 
 
 Regulatory arbitrage can be understood in a neutral or negative light—either as 
simply a subcategory of business decisionmaking or as harmful maneuvering that can 
distort regulatory competition, shift costs, and undermine the rule of law.127 Viewed from 
either perspective, understanding the constraints, boundaries, and limits of regulatory 
arbitrage is a worthy aim to the extent it can shed light on the dynamic relationship 
between business and law, and more specifically as it holds potential for policy makers 
interested in reducing activity that can sometimes harm social welfare.  
 This essay has explored extensions to the existing literature on constraints to 
regulatory arbitrage, including social license and the bundling of laws and resources. 
Further, it has examined how companies that have legally disruptive business models or 
innovations may find regulatory arbitrage of limited value in comparison to other 
																																																								
125 Ibid., pp 419-421. 
126 Ibid., pp 411-412, 421. 
127 See Fleischer (2010), p. 227. 
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strategies focused on shaping the legal environment. The above discussion of these three 
points—social license, bundling, and regulatory entrepreneurship—suggest that a 
complex set of factors and forces are at play in decisions about regulatory arbitrage, 
ranging from transparency of information to the public to the ability of a company to 
mobilize its users in support of legal change.  
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